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Rhetoric is one of the most important propaganda tools of the state. Carefully chosen and 
crafted words enable political leaders to put ideologies into words and present their preferred 
narrative to the world. Rhetoric becomes especially important when a state or political leader 
needs to justify something controversial. During the Cold War between the United States and the 
Soviet Union, the United States used rhetoric to justify rearming their former enemies West 
Germany and Japan. In particular, President Dwight Eisenhower used very specific and 
consistent rhetoric to justify West German rearmament. This rhetoric mirrored that which the 
United States had used several years earlier to justify Japanese rearmament. In order to 
understand this rhetoric, it is important to understand the circumstances that led to German and 
Japanese rearmament. 
 The end of the Second World War left the United States with a new set of challenges. 
Even as it emerged as the world’s leading military and economic power, American leaders did 
not feel secure. President Harry S. Truman’s Administration felt uneasy about the emerging 
superpower that was the Soviet Union, but they were unsure what approach to take. Eventually, 
the Truman Administration settled on a policy often referred to as the policy of containment. The 
policy of containment was, as its name suggests, a strategy for winning the Cold War which 
acknowledged that Soviet communism posed a threat to the United States that could not be 
allowed to spread. The focus in this policy was less on actually facing the Soviets on the 
battlefield than it was on preventing non-aligned countries, especially in Europe and Asia, from 
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becoming communist and making sure that these countries resisted communism and aligned 
themselves with the United States.1 
 One aspect of containment involved rebuilding countries that had been devastated by the 
Second World War. It was hoped that this assistance would make these countries less susceptible 
to a communist takeover. One of the most important of these rebuilding programs was the 
Marshall Plan, which emerged in 1947 as the brainchild of Secretary of State George C. 
Marshall. This plan, titled the European Recovery Program gave billions of dollars in aid to a 
number of western European countries, including West Germany in an effort to rebuild their 
shattered economies.2 The United States also took a more proactive role in places like Korea to 
directly prevent communist takeovers and took the initiative in creating defensive organizations 
like the North Atlantic Treaty Organization to help deter the spread of communism.3 Although it 
was created by the Truman Administration, the basic tenets of this policy generally animated 
United States policy for the early stages of the Cold War, even into the Eisenhower years. 
 One of the first major issues confronted by the United States during the Cold War were 
the logistics of occupying the defeated Axis Powers. The end of the war left much of Germany 
and Japan in ruins. Administration of Japan was placed in the hands of American General 
Douglas Macarthur, and the Japanese military machine was thoroughly dismantled. As Sayuri 
Guthrie Shimizu describes in The Cambridge History of the Cold War, the United States 
imposed a pacifist constitution that specifically prohibited Japan from possessing any sort of 
                                                          
1 Melvyn P. Leffler, “The Emergence of an American Grand Strategy, 1945-1952,” In The Cambridge History of 
The Cold War Volume 1, edited by Melvyn P. Leffler and Odd Arne Westad, (New York: Cambridge University 
Press, 2010), 73-76 
2 William I. Hitchcock, “ The Marshall Plan and the Creation of the West,” In The Cambridge History of the Cold 
War Volume 1, edited by Melvyn P. Leffler and Odd Arne Westad, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 
157-159.  
3 Leffler, 77-88.    
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military.4 This situation would only last for a few years before a radical shift in US policy 
occurred, eventually leading to Japanese rearmament. 
 By the late 1940’s, the United States’ position on rearming Japan had considerably 
changed. The San Francisco Peace Treaty and the Security Treaty between the United States and 
Japan granted Japan independence and officially ended the United States occupation. At the 
same time, however, Japan would have to rearm. By 1952, the Japanese government had created 
a National Safety Agency which had over one hundred thousand troops.5 The reasons for this 
reversal of American policy are often debated. Shimizu argues that the United States changed its 
position due to the changing Cold War situation. Basically, the Korean War created new United 
States security needs that could be best filled by Japanese rearmament. Thus, Japanese 
rearmament was the result of a deteriorating global situation which forced the United States to 
spread its forces too thinly to effectively carry out the policy of containment in Asia without 
Japanese aid. 
In contrast, however, Futoshi Shibayama argues that the United States’ change of attitude 
concerning Japanese rearmament had less to do with a changing situation and more to do with a 
shift in the United States’ assessment of its own security capabilities. According to Shibayama, 
the United States government felt like it could rely on its nuclear strength to defend its interests 
in East-Asia. In the event of war with the Soviet Union in that region, General MacArthur 
advocated for the liberal use of nuclear weapons to slow them down. This would eliminate the 
need for any need of Japanese troops. In fact, there was even some discussion of not defending 
                                                          
4 Sayuri Guthrie Shimizu, “Japan, the United States, and the Cold War, 1945-1960.”In The Cambridge History of 
the Cold War Volume 1, edited by Melvin P.Leffler and Odd Arne Westad, (New York: Cambridge University 
Press, 2010).  
5 Guthrie Shimizu, 254-255. 
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Japan at all. However, as American opinions on the use of atomic weapons changed, Japanese 
rearmament became a viable and desirable option.6  John Foster Dulles had been dispatched to 
Japan to begin preliminary work on the treaty before the outbreak of the Korean War, which 
seems to support Shibayama’s assertion that U.S. policy changed largely independently of the 
war.7 This is not to say that the war had no effect on the exact nature of the content of the treaty. 
The war may very well have been the reason that Japanese rearmament took the form that it did. 
It simply means that the idea of a treaty and of Japanese rearmament had taken hold before the 
Korean War.   
 In any case, the Truman administration came around to the idea that Japanese 
rearmament was a good idea, despite the fact that the Japanese Constitution expressly forbade it. 
During the negotiations that would become the San Francisco Peace treaty and the Security 
Treaty, John Foster Dulles, a Republican who would later serve as President Dwight 
Eisenhower’s Secretary of State, was the main American negotiator. It seems likely that Dulles 
was sent to help appease Republicans in congress who were critical of President Truman’s 
policies in Asia. After several rounds of negotiations which began in the summer of 1950, and 
lasted until September of 1951, a peace treaty emerged.8 
 The San Francisco Peace Treaty which came into force in April of 1952 was fairly 
lenient. It did not make any demands for reparations from Japan, and it did not have any sort of 
war guilt clause officially blaming Japan for the war.9 However, in return for this leniency the 
United States expected Japan to sign a security treaty at the same time as the peace treaty. In this 
                                                          
6 Futoshi Shibayama, “U.S. Strategic Debates Over the Defense of Japan: Lessons for the Twenty First Century,” 
The Journal of American- East Asian Relations 9, no. 1/2 (spring-summer 2000):  29-54.  
7 Louis L. Gerson, John Foster Dulles, (New York: Cooper Square Publishers, 1968), 62. 
8 Gerson, 62-67. 
9 Guthrie Shimizu, 252. 
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treaty Japan agreed to several things. First, Japan would give the United States, and only the 
United States, the rights to naval and air bases in Japan to be used as the United States 
government saw fit. Second these forces could be used to quell any sort of domestic disturbance 
in Japan. This presumably meant that the United States could intervene in the event of anything 
that looked like it might blossom into a communist takeover. Finally, Japan would, “Itself 
increasingly assume responsibility for its own defense.”10 This of course implied rearmament. 
While Japan was occupied and administered largely by American forces, Germany was 
divided into four occupation zones, each occupied by one of the major Allied powers, France, the 
United Kingdom, the United States, and the Soviet Union. Berlin was also split into four parts. 
Each of the occupying power appointed its own military government to manage the day to day 
operations of its zone. In theory these leaders would cooperate in something called the Allied 
Control Council to effectively rule the entire country. Hopefully, the Control Council would 
begin to form the basis of a new Germany of some sort which might eventually achieve some 
degree of independence. This system, which required unanimous decisions, began to fail almost 
immediately because the Allies could agree on virtually nothing.  In effect, each country ran its 
own zone according to its own values and ideas while hoping that, in the future, a united 
Germany would be created in its own image. For example, the United States created a state based 
federal system in its zone while the Soviet Union created a more centralized political system in 
its zone. 11 
                                                          
10 “Security Treaty Between the United States and Japan,” (Treaty, 8 September 1951), Avalon Project, accessed 18 
October, 2017, http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/japan001.asp   
11 Hans Peter Schwarz, “The Division of Germany, 1945-1949,” In The Cambridge History of the Cold War Volume 




 Economics was one of the most contentious areas among the Allied powers. The United 
States and the United Kingdom favored policies like the Marshall Plan, which would rebuild 
German industry and finance. Britain, the United States, and, to a lesser extent, France saw this 
as a necessary step in the economic recovery of Europe as a whole because the economies of 
Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg, were inextricably linked to that of western 
Germany. The Soviet Union viewed Germany as a source of potential reparations and even as a 
possible source of materials to rebuild their own industries, which had been largely destroyed by 
the war.12  
  These tensions over reparations and economic development combined with ideological 
differences between the Western democracies and the Soviet communists caused their respective 
zones of occupation to become increasingly divided. Things began to come to a head in the 
spring of 1947 when the British and American zones combined to form “Bizonia,” which would 
become the basis of the new Federal Republic of Germany.13 In 1948 France joined this 
conglomeration to form “Trizonia.” Trizonia continued to coalesce economically and politically 
until June 1948. In that month the Soviet Union launched its infamous blockade of the western 
zones of Berlin. They took this drastic action in response to the formation of Trizonia as well as 
the announcement of a constitutional assembly in the western zones and a currency reform that 
would give Trizonia a different currency than the Soviet zone. Much has been written about this 
failed blockade, but in short, the blockade was the step that finally made the division of Germany 
an irrevocable reality for the foreseeable future. In the fall of 1949, Trizonia became the 
capitalist West German Federal Republic while the Soviet zone became the communist East 
                                                          
12 Schwarz, 135-137. 
13 Schwarz, 140.  
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German Democratic Republic.14 This division, which would remain until 1989, was, and would 
remain, one of the key focal points of the Cold War. 
  Formalizing the existence of two distinct, independent German states created a whole 
new set of problems, not least of these was rearmament. Given the premises of the policy of 
containment, it should hardly be surprising that West Germany came to be seen as country in 
need of propping up against the “specter” of communist expansion, as well as a potentially useful 
military ally to bolster the forces of capitalism. Indeed, the first serious attempt at West German 
rearmament came only a few years after the formation of the Federal Republic.  
These initial plans for West Germany’s rearmament and entry into NATO were enshrined 
in an idea known as the European Defense Community, or EDC. In order to allay understandable 
French fears concerning a rearmed Germany, this plan entailed the formation of a sort of joint 
European army. This army would include West German troops, but these troops would not be 
under the overall command of German generals.15 Progress toward the creation of the EDC 
began during the Truman administration in the late 1940’s and continued into the early years of 
the Eisenhower administration in the early 1950’s. Things seemed to be going fairly well at first. 
Several countries ratified the European Defense Community. However, the program was 
eventually derailed by the French refusal to ratify and adopt the plan in late August of 1954.  
Then Secretary of State John Foster Dulles’s early biographer, Louis Gerson, attributed 
this failure to tensions between the United States and France over the war in Indochina.16 In 
contrast, however, in a 1974 interview, long time state department diplomat Clifford C. Matlock 
                                                          
14 Schwarz, 144-148. 
15 Leffler, 86. 
16 Gerson, 185-187. 
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blamed the European Defense Community’s demise on the Eisenhower administration’s failure 
to convince the French that West German rearmament would occur even if the European Defense 
Community were not ratified.17 It seems unlikely that this was some sort of French conspiracy to 
undermine West German rearmament forever. During this early stage of the Cold War, France’s 
position was complicated enough to be worthy of several papers in and of itself. However, 
Germany was certainly central to French thinking. The country began the occupation of 
Germany by advocating for complete dismemberment so that Germany could never pose a threat 
to France again. However, as the potential threat from the Soviet Union became more apparent, 
France gradually migrated into the Anglo-American camp, as evidenced by the formation of 
Trizonia. In 1954, France was trying to form an alliance strong enough to defend against Soviet 
aggression while simultaneously avoiding a renewed threat from Germany.18 It is easy to see 
how the EDC caused those two ideals to compete with each other in a way that might cause it to 
fail on the first try. Its failure may have had something to do with Indo-China, but it likely had 
much more to do with the fact that the French were far from unanimous about what direction 
their country’s policy regarding West German rearmament would take. 
 In any case, the proponents of West German rearmament now scrambled to find an 
alternate route, and it was not long before they found one. Within a month, nine NATO 
countries, West Germany and Italy sent representatives to London. Eventually, after a long series 
of diplomatic wranglings, all parties involved, including France, agreed to modify the 1945 
Brussels Treaty, which created NATO, to include West Germany and Italy. This treaty, and 
several other related ones, would become known as the London and Paris Accords. By the spring 
                                                          
17 Clifford C. Matlock, interview by Richard D. Mckinzie, Waynesville, North Carolina, June 6, 1974. Harry S. 
Truman Presidential Library, https://www.trumanlibrary.org/oralhist/matlock.htm . 
18 Frédéric Bozo, “France, Gaullism, and the Cold War,” In The Cambridge History of the Cold War Volume 2, 
edited by Melvyn P. Leffler and Odd Arne Westad, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 159-162. 
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of 1955, the requisite countries had ratified the treaty, and it officially came into force.19 West 
German rearmament was now a reality. 
Rearming the countries that had been the primary aggressors in the last world war, or, in 
Germany’s case, the last two world wars, was bound to be a controversial topic. The United 
States was the sole occupying power in Japan, so, in that case, it had only to contend with the 
contradictions between rearmament and the Japanese constitution. In the instance of West 
Germany, the United States had to convince it allies that rearmament was the proper way to go, 
but in both instances rearmament was certainly something that would have required some form 
of rhetorical justification. In West Germany’s case, the fact that the other side began rearming its 
part of Germany at almost the same time offered President Eisenhower’s administration the 
opportunity to divert any blame to America’s Cold War enemies. It was relatively easy to accuse 
those enemies of obstructing potential German reunification. It was also even possible to 
vaguely, or not so vaguely in some cases,20 accuse said enemies of reviving Nazi era German 
militarism.  
  President Eisenhower certainly felt like the Soviet Union was attempting to use this 
approach in March of 1959, when he fielded a question from Robert C. Pierpoint at a press 
conference about intimations that the Soviet Union was making regarding a possible summit 
meeting. The President responded forcefully to what he what he interpreted as Soviet propaganda 
alleging that, “the United States, or the West has rushed right in after the war to rearm West 
Germany.”21 Eisenhower responded to this suggestion by turning the accusation back around. He 
                                                          
19 Gerson, 216-219. 
20 Berlin Weekly Reports 218 and 219, Bernard Gufler, February 8-21, 1956, box3571, folder6-001, United States 
National Archives. 
21 Dwight Eisenhower, “The President’s News Conference of March 4, 1959,” in Public Papers of the Presidents: 
Dwight D. Eisenhower 1959, 48 (Washington DC: Government Printing Office, 1960). 
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did this first by denying that the United States had taken any steps to rearm West Germany 
before 1954, and then by quoting surprisingly specific figures alleging that East German 
rearmament occurred as early as 1950 and 1953, long before either the European Defense 
Community or the Paris Accords. The fact that he was able to quote exact numbers off of the top 
of his head indicates that this was likely a premeditated response to an issue that President 
Eisenhower anticipated ahead of time. Specifically, Eisenhower said that in 1950, East Germany 
had about 50,000 soldiers, but by 1953 this number had had nearly quintupled to around 
240,000.22 In this case, both sides appeared to be trying to blame the other for turning Germany 
into two fully armed states set in opposition to each other. 
 The type of blame placing displayed by the Soviet Union and President Eisenhower in 
this press conference was certainly nothing new. In May of 1955, just as West Germany was 
joining NATO, Henry Parkman, an American diplomat in Berlin, sent a telegram to Secretary of 
State John Foster Dulles describing how the East German press and government were responding 
to the news, According to Parkman, the East Germans believed that West German rearmament 
was a revival of the militarism that contributed to two world wars. This militarism, according to 
East German politicians, justified any rearmament that East Germany may undertake, as well as 
the formation of the Warsaw Pact Alliance as necessary defensive steps.23 In sum, the Soviet 
Union and its East German allies were definitely willing to play the blame game by accusing the 
west of reviving militarism in their haste to rearm Germany, and President Eisenhower was 
willing to turn the accusation around on them in his defense. However, this raises an important 
question. Did the United States, and, specifically, Eisenhower, use this type of accusation 
                                                          
22 Ibid.  




proactively as a justification for West German rearmament in the moment, or did Eisenhower 
merely use it as a convenient defense in this one instant. 
  These questions create further lines of inquiry. The first line of inquiry concerns whether 
or not the United States could have used this argument if they wanted to. Did the United States 
know about any East German rearmament early enough to be able to coopt it as a justification? 
Secondly, if they did have enough evidence to be able to convincingly make this argument, 
would they have chosen to use that approach or, alternatively, to use some other justification for 
West German rearmament. In short, President Eisenhower probably did know enough about East 
German rearmament in the key period 1950-1955 to be able to use the argument that West 
German rearmament was necessary to counter East German rearmament if he had wanted to. 
However, it really appears that Eisenhower did not want to make that argument at all. Ultimately, 
his justifications tended to go in a very different direction.   
The United States was definitely aware that East German rearmament of some sort was 
occurring as early as 1953, and the United States government was definitely informed about East 
German rearmament during the period from 1954-1956. In May of 1953, the Central Intelligence 
Agency (CIA) produced a report describing military vehicle production in East Germany for that 
year. The report, which was circulated to the State Department, the various branches of the 
military and the Federal Bureau of Investigation, described in detail what type of vehicles the 
state planned on producing, and even which particular police or paramilitary units these vehicles 
were earmarked for. It should be noted that these vehicles were fairly innocuous.24 They were 
trucks, locomotives, and cars instead of tanks or armored vehicles, and there is certainly room to 
                                                          
24 Central Intelligence Agency, “Planned Vehicle Production for the East German Military Forces in 1953,” 7 May 




debate just how much of a military the various East German armed services constituted. In fact, 
any forces equipped with vehicles such as these would probably be better suited to an internal 
security role than they would be to any aggressive military actions. However, this document does 
demonstrate an awareness on the part of the United States about the existence of East German 
armed services of some sort. It was certainly something that Eisenhower could have construed as 
an East German threat that would justify West German rearmament.   
 There were also a number of reports from State Department agencies in Berlin describing 
East German military activities in the period. For example, the weekly State Department report 
from Berlin for the week of May 11-17 of 1955 described the way that East German propaganda 
was attempting to root out “pacifist tendencies” among young men and noted that recruiting for 
paramilitary forces had increased substantially.25 The authors of this particular report were 
careful to note that they were not entirely certain what this meant exactly for East German 
rearmament, but it is certainly easy to see how the Eisenhower administration could have used 
the occurrences to further accusations of militarism. The concept of, “rooting out pacifistic 
tendencies” can mean a variety of things, but most of the immediate connotations seem overtly 
militaristic. If Eisenhower had been so inclined, he certainly could have used this to bolster any 
accusations of militarism. 
 By the first months of 1956, State Department officials were reporting military activities 
with soldiers in uniforms that, the authors of these reports were quick to point out, nearly 
identical to those that the Wehrmacht had worn in World War II. The authors also pointed out 
that the East Germans had created a military despite the fact that their national anthem talked 
                                                          
25 Berlin Weekly Report 179, David Henry and Henry Parkman, May 11-17, 1955, box3571, folder2-005, United 
States National Archives. 
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about the fact that communism eliminated the need for any more young men to die for their 
country. 26 It does not take a great deal of imagination to understand how these developments in 
East Germany could have been turned into accusations of militarism and possibly even 
accusations of a return to some of the ideas and practices that had led the Germans to become the 
villains in two world wars.  
To summarize, the Eisenhower administration was aware of East German rearmament 
during this period. In fact, The President had enough evidence to enable him to plausibly argue 
that West German rearmament was a necessary counterbalance to East German rearmament. 
However, that was not at all what he did. Instead Eisenhower took a very different approach. 
One that was based more on reasoning having more to do with West Germany’s status as an 
independent state than with a specific threat from East Germany. In fact, prior to the 1959 press 
conference, President Eisenhower did not publicly refer to any specific threat from East 
Germany as a rationalization for rearmament. Examination of The Public Papers of the 
Presidents, can help shed some light on what Eisenhower did, publicly, at least, use as his 
justification for West German rearmament. 
 The President spoke a number of times on this subject, and the narrative that he 
promoted was remarkably consistent. He tended to repeat the same justifications for rearmament 
over and over again, and this consistency can even aid our understanding of why Eisenhower 
used the rhetoric that he did by allowing us to compare it to the rhetoric that the United States 
had used several years previously regarding Japanese rearmament. Eisenhower’s rhetoric on 
West German rearmament had three basic components. First, Eisenhower consistently argued 
                                                          




that West German rearmament was an inevitable byproduct of that country’s independence and 
was consistent with the rights of sovereign states as they were understood at that time. Second, 
the President vigorously asserted that, contrary to what one might expect, West German 
rearmament would not hinder any potential efforts at future German reunification and might 
actually help to reduce Cold War tensions. Finally, the President argued that West German 
rearmament would promote peace, not threaten it.  
 In the summer of 1953, there were a number of unsuccessful uprisings in East Berlin and 
East Germany as a whole. After the uprisings, President Eisenhower wrote a letter to West 
German chancellor Konrad Adenauer discussing the significance of the uprisings. Eisenhower 
asserted that these uprisings were only the beginning, that they were not the work of American 
agitators, and that they revealed fatal flaws in the communist system of government. However, 
the President also made several interesting statements about West German rearmament, which at 
that time was enshrined in the European Defense Community, that were fairly consistent with the 
points that he would raise on other occasions.27  
First, Eisenhower argued that rearmament would not seriously hinder efforts at reunifying 
Germany. He defended this conclusion in a particularly roundabout manner. He did not say that 
he believed that rearmament would increase the possibilities for reunification, but he did state 
that it would not harm them in any significant way. His basic premise was that the increase in 
cooperation and integration between West Germany and the rest of Western Europe would 
heighten the already noticeable economic inequity between the two Germanys. As he put it, “this 
increasing contrast between eastern and western Germany, the latter with its bankrupt regime and 
                                                          
27 Dwight Eisenhower, “Letter to Chancellor Adenauer of Germany Concerning the Uprisings in East Berlin and 
East Germany,” in Public Papers of the Presidents: Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1953, 146 (Washington DC: 
Government Printing Office, 1960). 
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impoverished economy, will, in the long run produce conditions which should make possible the 
liquidation of the present communist dictatorship.”28  The steady stream of East Germans fleeing 
west would became a raging torrent, East Germans would begin to rebel in large numbers, and 
the communist government would become increasingly ineffective. Any tension caused by 
rearmament would not be enough to upset this inevitable progression in any serious way.29  
In addition, Eisenhower also argued that West German rearmament was inevitable. Even 
if Germany were unified at that very moment, the new one German government would still 
rearm much the same way that West Germany was. The President’s reasoning here was fairly 
simple. He could, “hardly imagine that it (Germany) would seek the path of complete and 
premature disarmament in the presence of other nations still heavily armed.” He continued, 
urging those who believed that an independent Germany could remain disarmed to, “carefully 
ponder the true wisdom and safety of such a course.”30 Put another way, West Germany, or a 
hypothetical unified German government would seek rearmament because that was what wise, 
well run states did. Eisenhower was speaking against those who believed they could suggest an, 
“easy safe solution through defenseless neutralization.”31 Germany could take whatever 
measures they wanted to, but in Eisenhower’s view, they would seek rearmament if they had 
their best interests in mind. 
Finally, the President stated his belief that West German rearmament would not be 
detrimental to peace, but would actually help to insure peace. Here Eisenhower employed the 
classic peace through strength argument. He did acknowledge the fact that two world wars had 
                                                          
28 Ibid. 
29 Ibid. 




recently occurred because of military aggression, but he assured his audience that the death and 
destruction caused by those wars meant that there was no chance that any Western power would 
pursue their goals through military aggression. However, he argued that, “The peace we all 
dearly seek cannot be maintained through weakness.”32 Therefore, all free countries had to 
maintain at least some military forces to serve as a means of deterring and defending against 
non-democratic (communist) powers that might attack them. 
President Eisenhower’s letter to Chancellor Adenauer contained references to all of the 
main arguments that he used to justify West Germany rearmament, and it contained no 
references to any kind of threat from East German rearmament. In fact, it said that a unified 
Germany, including East Germany, would want to rearm if its leaders were wise. It did contain a 
reference to outside forces that might threaten free countries, but one never got the sense that 
West German rearmament had anything to do with countering some specific threat from a 
rearmed East Germany.  
Although in his letter to Chancellor Adenauer, Eisenhower was speaking to a specific 
foreign dignitary, in general he used the same arguments in other contexts as well. In November 
of 1954, after the European Defense Community plan had fallen, Eisenhower pointed out the 
merits of the Paris Accords to the United States Senate. Even though his audience was different, 
Eisenhower reiterated basically the same principles that he had used over a year previously. He 
did not discuss the idea of German reunification in this message, however, possibly because his 
intended senatorial audience would be less concerned about that issue than the West German 
                                                          
32 Ibid.  
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Chancellor. However, he still argued that West German rearmament was really the inevitable 
result of natural processes, and that it would actually help make the world more peaceful. 
 Eisenhower again spent a great deal of time in this message discussing how West 
German rearmament was inexorable. Once again, Eisenhower made an explicit connection 
between sovereignty and rearmament. He simply did not even entertain the idea that a sovereign 
Germany would not be disarmed. For example, he said that, “The Federal Republic is placed on 
a basis of full equality with other states.” In the next sentence, he then immediately talked about 
how West German military forces would be integrated into NATO.33 He also expended a great 
deal of effort to explain how West German rearmament was consistent with the founding values 
of NATO, as expressed in the Brussels Treaty of 1948, and principle of West German 
independence, as enshrined in the 1952 Bonn Conventions, which had fallen by the wayside with 
the failure of the EDC. Eisenhower also reminded the senators that the senate had 
overwhelmingly approved both of those treaties.34 Once again, the President’s message seemed 
to be that West German rearmament would not be harmful and that it was inseparably related to 
the issue of West German independence. 
Eisenhower did not specifically mention German reunification in his message to the 
senate. However, he did talk at length on the idea that West German rearmament would actually 
promote the cause of peace. Once again, he argued that, consistent with the policy of 
containment, a fully armed West Germany would act as a much needed addition to the forces of 
capitalism. This increased strength would then place the now militarily stronger NATO alliance 
                                                          
33 Dwight Eisenhower, “ Special Message to the Senate Transmitting Protocols to Treaties Relating to the Federal 
Republic of Germany, November 15, 1954,” in Public Papers of the Presidents: 1954, 332, (Washington DC: 




into a better position to deter or defeat any sort of communist aggression. However, in this 
instance he went further, claiming that the agreements that he was presenting to the senate for 
ratification might even result in something “far beyond the combining of strength to deter 
aggression.” He went on to elaborate that that something was, “a new understanding among the 
free peoples of Europe and a new spirit of friendship which will inspire greater cooperation in 
many fields of human activity.”35 Eisenhower used some highly idealistic rhetoric in this 
particular message, but the point is that the President once again argued that West German 
rearmament was no threat to peace. Instead, it was to be seen a positive force helping to ensure 
lasting peace. 
A picture of Eisenhower’s rhetoric on the topic of West German rearmament is beginning 
to emerge. Eisenhower consistently argued that rearmament was an inevitable part of granting 
Germany its independence. When it seemed appropriate he, assured the audience that 
rearmament would not have any appreciable effect on potential German reunification because the 
forces that would affect the chances for reunification were inherent fundamental parts of the 
dichotomy between communism and capitalism and were too powerful to be derailed by any 
tension over rearmament. Finally, Eisenhower insisted that West German rearmament would not 
make war more likely or signal a return to militarism. Instead, it would help the cause of peace 
by strengthening the forces that deterred aggressive Soviet-aligned countries from attacking. 
 In March of 1955, upon the ratification of the Paris Agreements which finally began the 
process of West German rearmament, Eisenhower sent an identical message to the prime 
ministers of Belgium, France, West Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and the 




United Kingdom. This message expressed his pleasure at their adoption of the course of action 
laid out in the Paris Accords and the benefits and advantages that these countries had received by 
ratifying the agreement. The President also took the opportunity to lay out what he saw as the 
United States’ policy positions under the Paris Accords. Once again, Eisenhower advanced some 
of the same ideas about West German rearmament.  
First, the President again connected rearmament to West German sovereignty. He talked 
about the way that the citizens of the Federal Republic had proven that they were, “capable of 
worthily discharging their responsibilities as self-governing members of the free and peaceful 
world community.” Lest anyone doubt whether those responsibilities entailed rearmament, the 
President clarified by specifying that one of the other purposes of the Accords was to enable the 
Federal Republic to make its, “appropriately measured contribution to international peace and 
security.” 36 According to Eisenhower, West German rearmament was inevitable because West 
Germany was independent and independent states, especially those that were members of the 
Western bloc and NATO, were expected to do their part militarily to help guard against 
communist aggression.  
Once again the issue of German reunification was not specifically mentioned, but 
Eisenhower did argue that the Paris Accords and West German rearmament would actually help 
the cause of peace. Eisenhower reiterated his concept that peace could be achieved only through 
strength Therefore, rearmament would help to achieve the aims of the policy of containment by 
deterring the Soviet Union from any military aggression. This would prevent the spread of 
communism long enough for the forces that the President had described in his letter to 
                                                          
36 Dwight Eisenhower, “ Message to the Prime Ministers of the Seven Nations Signatory to the Protocols 
Establishing the Western European Union, March 10, 1955,” in Public Papers of the Presidents: Dwight D. 
Eisenhower, 1955, 54, (Washington DC: Government Printing Office, 1959). 
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Chancellor Adenauer to take effect which would lead to a capitalist victory in the Cold War and 
the reunification of Germany, or as Eisenhower pointed out, West German rearmament would 
help prevent the outbreak of another war like the ones which had ravaged Europe in 1914 and 
1939.37   
Eisenhower probably could have used the fear of a remilitarized East Germany as 
justification for rearming the Federal Republic if he had wanted. Instead, he took an approach 
that emphasized the positives of rearmament while minimizing any potential negatives. He 
argued that rearmament would not seriously hinder German reunification, and would not threaten 
the fragile Cold War peace. In his letter to Chancellor Adenauer, he described a process by 
which German reunification would happen naturally even with rearmament, and in his messages 
to the United States Senate and to the NATO Prime Ministers, he stated his belief that 
rearmament decreased the chances of war by providing a more effective deterrent against the 
spread of communism by military means. Finally, Eisenhower believed that independence was 
innately connected to rearmament. An Independent West Germany would definitely have a 
military if its leaders were wise, and if they took their responsibilities for maintaining 
international peace as seriously as Eisenhower believed they should. To put it colloquially, to 
Eisenhower, rearmament was no big deal. It was just something that was going to happen that 
would not really make the situation worse. In fact, it might even help to reduce tensions and 
make war less likely. 
Why Eisenhower took this position instead of using some sort of public blaming of the 
East Germans or Soviets to justify rearmament is a complicated question. After all, as Hans Peter 




Schwarz argues, both sides, and even some more modern observers, loudly blamed the other for 
the division of Germany into communist and capitalist states.38 There are several possible 
reasons why Eisenhower chose not to denounce East German rearmament. Eisenhower might 
have felt that he did not have the moral high ground on that issue, because official East German 
rearmament and the formation of the Warsaw Pact came after the Federal Republic’s entry into 
NATO.39 This would enable the communists to legitimately argue that they were only reacting to 
West German rearmament. Condemning East German rearmament would also run counter to the 
narrative that the President was creating by emphasizing the idea that rearmament was inevitable 
and harmless. When trying to discover the sources of these arguments, it is helpful to note that 
the United States advanced some of the same justifications for West German rearmament that it 
had several years previously for Japanese rearmament, even though Japanese rearmament had 
occurred during the Truman administration.  
   The United States used a connection between sovereignty and rearmament to justify 
Japanese rearmament. This connection is particularly obvious when one thinks about the fact that 
the same peace treaty that gave Japan its sovereignty after over 5 years of American occupation 
was contingent upon the signing of a security treaty which provided for Japanese rearmament. 
According to the text of the treaty, the security agreement between Japan and the United States 
was necessary because Japan, which had just become independent, was incapable of exercising 
its right to defend itself, but Japan would soon take steps to rectify this situation.40 The ability to 
defend itself was simply assumed as one of the characteristics of a truly independent state. 
                                                          
38 Schwarz, 150-152 
39 Schwarz, 148-149 
40 Ibid.  
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The security treaty also demonstrated the assumption that rearmament would be help 
advance the cause of peace. It did this in several ways. First, it argued that Japanese rearmament 
was consistent with international norms. In this case, it referenced the Charter of the United 
Nations which said in Article 1 that one of the primary purposes of the United Nations was to 
maintain international peace through collective and individual security.41 The security treaty 
argued that Japanese rearmament was entirely consistent with this goal. It did this by claiming 
that Japan would avoid, “Any armament which could be an offensive threat or serve other than to 
promote peace and security.”42 Basically, the United States justified Japanese rearmament by 
arguing that rearmament was just what independent countries were supposed to do. It also 
alleged that this rearmament was consistent with a preexisting international agreement that the 
audience would have likely considered to be authoritative. 
These justifications were extremely similar to those that Eisenhower used for West 
German rearmament. The assertion that Japan should rearm because that was just what sovereign 
states did was echoed in several of Eisenhower’s statements. In particular, Eisenhower expressed 
that idea in his letter to Chancellor Adenauer, saying that Germany would want to rearm even if 
Germany was somehow instantly united and the Cold War was not a factor.43 He also expressed 
this same sort of idea in his message to the prime ministers who signed the Paris Accords. He 
argued that West Germany had a responsibility as an independent state to contribute to 
maintaining peace through collective security which of course entailed rearmament.44 These 
                                                          
41 United Nations, “Charter of the United Nations,” (Treaty, 26 June, 1945), Avalon Project, accessed 13 November, 
2017, http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/unchart.asp  
42 Security Treaty Between the United States and Japan. 
43  Dwight Eisenhower, “Letter to Chancellor Adenauer.”  
44 Dwight Eisenhower, “Message to Prime Ministers.” 
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arguments were incredibly similar to those which the Truman administration used to justify 
Japanese rearmament.  
The similarities between the American rhetoric on Japanese rearmament and West 
German rearmament did not end there, however. In the security treaty, the United States argued 
that Japanese rearmament would actually help make the world a more peaceful place. The 
military forces created would be used for helping to maintain the peace in accordance with 
protocols that the audience already recognized as legitimate. This was, of course the same 
argument that Eisenhower made over and over again to justify West German rearmament. For 
example, in his message to the United States Senate, the President argued that the Paris Accords 
which enabled West German rearmament were consistent with the resolutions that the senate had 
already adopted regarding West German independence. Likewise, when he addressed the prime 
ministers of NATO countries, he was careful to point out that West German rearmament was 
consistent with the principles that NATO was founded on. Eisenhower also consistently stated 
that any West German military would be used for purely defensive purposes to defend the 
Federal Republic from any aggression. The idea that rearmament was a defense against 
militarism instead of a revival of militarism was present in virtually everything that Eisenhower 
said on the subject, and it was virtually identical to statements contained in the security treaty 
that made Japanese rearmament official. 
The similarity between American rhetoric on Japanese rearmament and Eisenhower’s 
justifications for West German rearmament can be explained in a number of different ways. It is 
certainly possible that this was simply how the United States justified things like that at this time. 
Further research into the type of rhetoric that was used in other administrations would be needed 
to say whether or not this was a factor in President Eisenhower’s rhetoric. It is possible, however 
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to make a connection between the Eisenhower administration and the Japanese treaties based on 
the fact that the American diplomat charged with negotiating with Japan was none other than 
John Foster Dulles.  
The Eisenhower administration, then, basically continued to use the same rhetoric about 
West German rearmament that the Truman administration had used to justify Japanese 
rearmament in the security treaty that the United States imposed on Japan. In both instances, the 
United States argued that there was an inherent connection between independence and 
rearmament. Basically, any sovereign state that was smart and took its responsibilities seriously 
would want to rearm. The United States also argued, both in the case of Japan and the Federal 
Republic of Germany, that rearmament did not make war more likely. In fact, it generally argued 
that rearmament was essential for maintaining the peace.  
The origins of these opinions are difficult to ascertain with accuracy. However, John 
Foster Dulles’s involvement in both Japanese and West German rearmament offers a clue. He 
was certainly an influential official in the Eisenhower administration, and it seems likely that he 
could have influenced the President’s strategy when making public statements. Whether Dulles 
was directly involved or not, Eisenhower certainly echoed Dulles’s sentiments almost exactly on 
a number of occasions, and the President only condemned  East German rearmament when he 
felt that he had to after he was directly challenged on the subject. 
The finding that the United States and President Eisenhower did not use East German 
rearmament to justify rearming West Germany and instead used the same arguments about 
sovereignty is significant because it builds on work by Schwarz, Odd Arne Westad, and others to 
increase our understanding of the Eisenhower administration’s policy goals, and it helps to 
demonstrate that rearmament for the Eisenhower administration was not a reaction to East 
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German rearmament or some other specific threat. It was merely one more weapon to help carry 
out the Policy of Containment. It could also provide a baseline for later studies. One possibly 
fruitful avenue of inquiry might be a study of how American rhetoric surrounding the West and 
East German militaries changed as the Cold War continued. Eisenhower’s rhetoric might also be 
useful for those investigating Odd Arne Westad’s assertion that some form of social Darwinism 
played a role in the policies of the Cold War superpowers because, while he was justifying West 
German rearmament, Eisenhower frequently mentioned his belief that capitalism would defeat 
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